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INTRODUCTION

Markets serve goals such as efficiently allocating resources and entitlements, rewarding desert, inculcating virtues, and spreading power.
This Article focuses on another-arguably the most fundamental-goal:
markets can serve our right to self-authorship (or self-determination).
The aim of this Article is to study the market's autonomy-enhancing
telos.

Markets are potentially conducive to people's self-determination because alienating resources and entitlements enables geographical, social,
familial, professional, and political mobility, which is often a prerequisite
of meaningful autonomy. Markets are also important to self-authorship
because they facilitate people's ability to legitimately enlist one another
in the pursuit of private goals and purposes, both material and social,
thus enhancing our ability to be the authors of our own lives.
* Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation, Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law; Director, The Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Tel-Aviv University;
Visiting Professor (Fall 2017), Cornell Law School. Thanks to Greg Alexander, Lisa Alexander, Bernadette Atuahene, Aditi Bagchi, Oren Bracha, Eric Claeys, Nestor Davidson, Avihay
Dorfman, Daphna Hacker, Martijn Hesselink, Roy Kreitner, Jeff Rachlinski, Annelise
Riles, Anna di Robilant, Chris Serkin, Hila Shamir, Talha Syed, Lyn K.L. Tjon Soei Len,
Katrina Wyman, as well as participants of the 2017 International Summer School of The Centre for the Study of European Contract Law at Amsterdam, the 2017 Property Work in Progress Conference, and the Cornell-TAU Conference on The Ethical Challenges of the Market
for helpful comments.
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Appreciating these two autonomy-enhancing roles of the market entails important lessons for liberal law, because a liberal polity is expected
to found its major institutions on the commitment to people's autonomy.
Most of these lessons take the form of interpretive recommendations regarding the market's desirable design as well as instructions as per the
background regime it requires. But the status of self-authorship as the
ultimate commitment of liberal law suggests that some lessons may go
further than that. It implies that at times autonomy may function as a
constraint that trumps the market's other goals when they conflict.
Markets with the primary goal of autonomy-enhancement will have
several characteristics. Autonomy-enhancing markets must allow universal participation since exclusion and discrimination would undermine
their raison d'8tre. They should also set limits on the power to alienate
whenever it erodes our ability to rewrite our life-story and start anew.
Such markets should proactively ensure meaningful choices in each major sphere of human action and interaction; however, this injunction of
intra-sphere multiplicity must be curtailed where cognitive, behavioral,
structural, and political economy reasons imply that more choice may
actually reduce autonomy. Moreover, when markets are structured to
serve autonomy, market relationships are governed by rules that comply
with the prescription of reciprocal respect for self-determination, meaning that party interactions in the market are governed by the maxim of
relational justice. Finally, since utility is understood to be instrumental to
the markets' ultimate value, which is autonomy, the law of the market
must avoid the commodification of people and interpersonal relationships. It should thus employ, in some subsets of the settings it governs,
techniques of incomplete commodification ensuring that, while entitlements are exchanged, interactions retain a personal aspect.
I.

THE TASK

Markets are complex social institutions which heavily rely on, if
they are not strictly constituted by, a thick legal infrastructure. In the
various shapes and forms they take, markets play a key role in the fabric
of both domestic and transnational interactions. The omnipresence of
markets in society today may account for their tendency to attract both
avid advocates and enthusiastic critics.' This Article has no pretense to
summarize or evaluate this voluminous literature, let alone the multifaceted reality which it analyzes.
My task is different. I take it for granted that-like other major
social institutions (states, communities, etc.)-market mechanisms are
1 See ALBERT 0. HIRscHmAN, RivAL Vmws
ESSAYS 105-24 (1986).

OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT
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here to stay. And while I do not deny that markets serve various goals
such as those noted at the outset, I seek to explore their justification, and
thus their proper constitution, from the standpoint of the ultimate liberal
commitment to individual self-authorship. This Part studies the two main
roles markets play in facilitating people's self-authorship. The next Part
explores the ways these autonomy-based justifications can and should
inform the legal design of the market.
A.

Markets

To elucidate the putative contribution of markets to autonomy, we
need to have at least a rough account of what a market is, and some
understanding of why self-authorship should be the liberal litmus test for
markets' legitimacy. I begin with an account of the market, which-interestingly enough-turns out to be a tricky business.
Some accounts of the market are built around a model of an ideal
market. This strategy often makes sense. Thus, given the assumption that
markets are aimed at maximizing efficiency, it is reasonable for economists to (explicitly or implicitly) treat the perfectly competitive market,
typified by perfect information, full rationality, and no transaction costs,
as the ideal market. 2 Similarly, an account that highlights the moral virtues markets tend to inculcate would sensibly opt for a somewhat different picture of the ideal market, one that revolves around institutionalizing
3
civilized exchange amongst strangers.
This Article, which begins with the question of how markets can
facilitate autonomy, cannot follow this strategy. Instead, I need to resort
to a broader and less judgmental account to flesh out the common distinctive properties of the heterogeneous trading activities we typically
call markets. With that baseline (pre-theoretical) account in mind, I can
then form the conception of the ideal market from an autonomy perspective. 4 This is why I begin with John O'Neill's definition of markets as
"social and institutional arrangements through which goods [or services]
are regularly produced for, distributed by and subject to contractual
forms of exchange in which money and property rights over goods are
5
transferred between agents."
2 See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 76-77, 79 (1921);
George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 14
(1957).
3 See, e.g., NATHAN B. OMAN, TiE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 23-30 (2016).
4 Cf William A. Jackson, On the Social Structure of Markets, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
235, 249 (2007).
5 JoHN O'NEILL, THm MARKET: ETHICS, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 4 (1998). I think
that my addition of "services" does not deviate from the thrust of this definition and is required
in order to properly cover all market activities. For a somewhat similar definition, see GEOF-

580

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 27:577

As this definition clarifies, markets are robust infrastructures that
enable systemic, repeatable acts of exchange. For markets to function,
property rights and modes of their legitimate transfer need to be defined
and respected and contracts should be honored and enforced. For markets
to go beyond barter exchanges, they also need to rely on a common,
acceptable, liquid currency, namely: money (widely understood as any
generic means of exchange). Highlighting the crucial role property, contracts, and money play in the constitution of contemporary markets is
important. Although it does not imply that markets cannot exist without
6
law-law-like social conventions can, and have, facilitated markets this simple observation does mean that where law exists, its prescriptions
provide at least some of the foundations of the market.
O'Neill's definition also helpfully emphasizes that markets institutionalize specific types of transactions. Market transactions are voluntary, rather than compulsory, undertakings; and they are "two-way
transfers, leaving no doubts about reciprocity or future payments (unlike
one-way transfers such as gifts, which may or may not carry an implicit
duty to reciprocate). ' '7 Both of these features point to core characteristics
of the market. The voluntariness of market transactions implies that
"[m]arkets call up our power as individual decision makers who can veto
as well as sign on to exchanges, and they give scope to the exercise of
these powers." '8 The distinction between a market and a gift exchange
suggests that while the latter "aims to realize a shared good in the relationship itself," the former-exchange through market transaction-focuses on realizing "distinct goods for each party." 9
Markets' focus on voluntary exchanges will occupy much of the
following discussion. 10 At this stage, the exclusion of gift exchanges
from our definition of markets deserves a closer examination. Some
FREY HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS:

A

MANIFESTO FOR A MODERN INSTITUTIONAL

ECONOMICS 174 (1988).
6 Cf.OMAN, supra note 3, at 34-35.

7 Jackson, supra note 4, at 236.
8 DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF

MARKETS 22 (2010).
9 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 151 (1993).

10 Nathan Oman suggests that voluntariness need not be "an attribute of well-functioning
markets." OMAN, supra note 3, at 27. Part of his argument relies on the familiar difficulties in
defining consent, and thus voluntariness, which are real, but cannot imply the detachment of
markets from voluntary transactions. Another premise of this purported disconnection is the
suggestion that consumer transactions cannot plausibly be understood as premised on contractual consent. Id. at 29. But a proper understanding of consumer contracts implies, as I argue
elsewhere, that in this context voluntariness is secured by ensuring that the non-bargained
terms correspond to (or exceed) consumers' typical expectations, so that attributing consent to
the consumer is no more objectionable than attributing consent to a buyer of a car who lacks
knowledge of its mechanical features. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL A. HELLER, THE
CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 83 (2017).
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scholars, including O'Neill, learn from this exclusion that "market relations are essentially impersonal." 1 1 Elizabeth Anderson's influential account of the "norms structuring market relations" goes even further than
that. These norms, Anderson claims, "embody the economic ideal of
freedom: they are impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and
oriented to 'exit' rather than 'voice' .' 12 Some markets are indeed typified by a few of these characteristics. But my definition of the market
does not resort to any one of them as the sine qua non of the market.
I appreciate the role Anderson's definition plays in her account,
which is analogous to the role of an ideally efficient or virtuous market
in the accounts with which I have started. Anderson's account highlights
the dangers of market imperialism and, thus, focuses on those market
interactions that are as different as possible from other types of interactions. But for the purposes of this Article Anderson's definition is unduly
restrictive. As William Jackson notes, alongside markets of impersonal
trading "such that sellers and buyers compete anonymously and aim only
to obtain the best available price," oftentimes "traders take part in relational exchange": they "develop personal relationships going beyond
their impersonal roles" and thus "no longer respond to price alone."
Therefore, there is no reason to assign anonymous trading a privileged
13
status in "a 'marketness' scale."
B.

Self-Authorship

In what follows, I hope to highlight the main ways in which markets
can, if properly configured and calibrated, contribute to our freedom. The
claim that connects markets and freedom is, of course, not innovative.
But usually the freedom that is associated with markets is negative: it is
freedom as independence; freedom from the interference of others, either
individuals or the state. (This may explain the frequent association between libertarianism and free market advocacy.)
Many have criticized the claim (or, more often, implicit presupposition) that markets can be free in this way by highlighting how markets
11

supra note 5, at 12.
supra note 9, at 144-45.
13 Jackson, supra note 4, at 236-37, 239, 241. O'Neill recognizes the heterogeneity of
markets, but nonetheless insists on the impersonality of market relations by relegating the
personal bonds of the less impersonal market formations to the status of "accidental features,"
which are "eroded" as trading transcends historic small-knit communities. O'NEIL, supra note
5, at 12. As the text suggests, relational contracts are far from being marginal or declining in
modem, developed markets economies, and the relational setting in which these contracts are
situated affects their structure and content. See Robert E. Scott, The Promise and the Peril of
Relational Contract Theory, in REVISITING THE CONTRACT SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 105, 108 (Jean Braucher et al. eds. 2013).
O'NEILL,

12 ANDERSON,
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depend upon the power of law. 14 My observations regarding the legal
foundations of the market 15 follow a somewhat refined version of this
critique, which is why I will not attempt to rehabilitate the libertarian, or
"neoliberal," understanding of the market. 16 Indeed, my account of the
market is diametrically opposed to the one celebrated by neoliberals. But
tracing the roots of its error is still worthwhile, because it can point to a
more promising conceptualization of the relationship between markets
and freedom.
Linking markets with negative liberty echoes the association of the
market's building blocks-property and contract-with independence,
manifested in theories that view property and contract as fundamentally
duty-imposing. This understanding holds if claims of owners and of
promisees towards (respectively) non-owners and promisors can be conceptualized as extensions of the natural duty to refrain from interfering
with the external freedom of others. But both property and contract work
differently: rather than vindicating existing rights, they are both primarily
power-conferring.
As power-conferring legal doctrines, both property and contract "attach legal consequences to certain acts" in order "'to enable people to
affect norms and their application in such a way if they desire to do so
for this purpose." 1 7 To be sure, duties not to interfere with people's
rights are of course also relevant to both property law and contract law.
But these piggy-backing (duty-imposing) rules would be meaningless in
the absence of the power-conferring institutions of property and contract
because their role is to protect our ability to apply the powers enabled by
these institutions. They rely on, and should thus be circumscribed by, the
normative commitments that explain and justify the legal powers charac18
teristic of property or contract in the first place.
Thus, contract is "a particularly valuable means for pursuing ends,"
because, by recognizing people's power to undertake obligations, it allows individuals to provide credible assurances "to induce promisees to
assist them in realizing their ends." 19 Property is similarly empowering:
the unusual authority it confers on owners with regard to certain re14 See CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 5 (1998). See also, e.g.,
ANDREW SAYER, RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CRITIQUE AND REFORMULATION 93 (1995).
15 See supra text accompanying note 3.
16 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005); David Singh

Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Law and Neoliberalism, 77(4) L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2014).
17 Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1739 (2008) (citing JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 102
(1975)).
18 See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 10, at 37-39; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman,

The Human Right to Private Property, 18 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 391, 398-400 (2017).
19 Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondenceof Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603, 1608-09 (2009).
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sources is best justified by reference to the respect ownership garners
from other individuals and the polity as a whole. This respect is for the
owner's right to self-determine according to her own conception of the
20
good.
In other words, at least in their best light, both contract and property
are understood as frameworks of respectful interaction conducive to selfdetermining individuals. 2 1 Self-determination represents a rich conception of freedom: its value is what makes our independence worthwhile.
We are all entitled to be free from coercion because this freedom is necessary for each of us if we are to each write individually the story of our
22
(separate but interdependent) lives.
This is why liberals insist that an individual person is free, not
merely in the formal sense of not being subordinated to the choices of
another, but also in the more robust sense of being able to make meaningful choices about how his or her life should go. Free individuals, John
Rawls writes, act on their capacity "to have, to revise, and rationally to
pursue a conception of the good. ' 23 A person can be "free" in the formal
sense simply because no one else is in a position of domination over her.
But this conception is too narrow because it fails to ensure an opportunity for that person to form and pursue a conception of the good. As
H.L.A. Hart observed, self-determination is necessary for people to lead
the fully human life they are entitled to; while this requires a measure of
independence, it "is not something automatically guaranteed by a struc'24
ture of negative rights."
Understanding contract and property as empowering devices places
self-determination, rather than independence, at the moral core of the
market. This is significant because in a liberal polity, in which law is
legitimate only if it may be acceptable to free and equal persons, conceptualizing the market around the conception of property as a stronghold of
independence undermines it legitimacy. As critics have noted, it is not
merely hypothetical, but rather counterfactual to submit that non-owners
(to whom the argument for the system's legitimation is first and foremost
owed) freely consent in any form to that understanding of the market. By
contrast, a private law regime, and thus a conception of the market, pre20 See generally Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 18.
21 As the text implies, I do not argue that serving autonomy is, or should be, invoked as
the justification for deciding individual cases in either contract or property. Rather, my claim is
that the doctrinal components (concepts and rules) of both fields are best understood as means
for serving their autonomy-enhancing telos. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 10, at 37-39;
HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (forthcoming 2019).
22 As the text implies, the following paragraphs assume a certain (liberal) conception of
the self, which is admittedly not universally embraced. For an extended discussion and defense
of this assumption, see DAGAN, supra note 21, at ch. 2.
23 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT

19 (2001).

24 H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 836 (1979).
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mised on the liberal commitment to self-determination (and thus guided
by the prescriptions developed below) is a more plausible candidate for a
self-imposed law. Conferring on individuals the power to participate in
the various practices constituted by property and contract has a better
chance of gaining support in a liberal polity due to the contribution of
these legal (or law-like) conventions to people's right to self25
authorship.
C.

Two Roles

This understanding of property and contracts points to the two main
ways in which markets are potentially conducive to people's autonomy:
they allow individuals the mobility that is a prerequisite for self-determination, and they expand the options available to individuals to function
as the authors of their own lives.
Markets enable mobility through the alienation of resources and entitlements. By facilitating the liquidation of existing holdings markets
facilitate people's right to exit: to withdraw or refuse to further engage,
to dissociate, to cut themselves out of a relationship with other persons.
At a minimum, exit serves a protective function. Leaving is a form of
self-defense, and the mere possibility (and thus implicit threat) of one's
exit plays an important disciplinary function. Moreover, even with no
concern of mistreatment, exit is crucial to autonomy because open
boundaries enable geographical, social, familial, professional, and politi26
cal mobility, which is, in turn, a prerequisite for a self-directed life.
The robust mobility of the market is famously contrasted with social
relationships of servility. As Adam Smith (as well as John Stuart Mill
and Karl Marx) argued, markets substitute the fixity of status and command with relations based on interest, persuasion, and consent. They,
therefore, tend to undermine hierarchies in which loyalty is taken for
granted and need not be enlisted and accounted for. The market can thus
liberate individuals from predetermined roles and social positions and
emancipate them from relationships of excessive dependency on the au27
thority of others.
25 See Hanoch Dagan, The Utopian Promise of Private Law, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 392,
410-12 (2016). See also Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 18, at 401-04.
26 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 21-29 (1970); Leslie Green,
Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165, 176 (1998); cf Michael Walzer, The Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 11-12, 15-16, 21 (1990).
27 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: How EMPLOYERS RULE OUR
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON'T TALK ABOUT IT) 4, 17-22 (2017); O'NEILL, supra note 5, at 71,

77-78; JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 16-17 (2010); SATZ, supra note 8, at 24-25, 41-42. This argument is related to, but nonetheless distinct from, the celebration of the market as a regime of polycentric
governance. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962); RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

139-42, 238 (1998).
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Some critics of the choices markets open up present them as a postmodem game with one's identity, in which people playfully slip off any
commitment they have to other persons and projects and move into another, just as they easily change clothes with changing fashions. They
note that a constantly changeable individual-whose life is a "series of
unrelated episodes"-is "not an autonomous individual, but rather one
who lacks any sense of self and whose life lacks any narrative form."
Because the market tends to undermine in this way the necessary conditions for having settled dispositions and commitments that define what it
is to have a self, so the argument goes, it endangers, rather than fosters,
28
autonomy.
Some (extreme) forms of consumerism may deserve this critique.
But the idea of the market does not. To begin with, recall that markets
are not uniformly responsive to price only, and that market governance
does not necessarily imply impersonality. So the critique confuses one
market form, which typifies certain one-shot exchanges and the norms
governing consumer goods, for the essence of the market.2 9 Numerous
market transactions, however, are relational: they rely on robust interpersonal commitments and a good dosage of voice, and thus create thin, and
in certain cases even thick, communities. 30 Exit is preserved, as it should
be, in these contractual communities, but its phenomenology is very different from the post-modem caricature of the market: it is premised on an
intermittent critical perspective on the relationship and its continuous
31
value in the parties' lives.
Still, there are surely many market formations, which are typified by
anonymous one-shot trading; however, even they need not necessarily
endanger autonomy. Indeed, insofar as these strictly calculative market

types govern strictly utilitarian interactions, they often contribute to autonomy, rather than threatening it. Thus, for example, 32 facilitating a
purely instrumental conception of consumer contracts allows people to
make quick and secure consumption decisions, which frees them up to
engage in their other, more valuable projects. 33 More generally, trading
28 O'NEILL, supra note 5, at 75-77, 79-80, 82-83.
29 See supra text accompanying note 13.
30 See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 10, at 58-63.

69 (2011).
Another example for an indirect contribution of market behavior to autonomy comes
up in the context of investment decisions of pension funds that transcend pure preference
satisfaction and implicate investors' pursuit of non-financial goals. See Roy Kreitner, Money
Talks: Institutional Investors and Voice in Contract, 20 TI-EORETIcAL INQ. L. (forthcoming
2019).
33 See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 10, at 73, 81-82. This virtue of consumer contracts
need not absolve consumers from moral responsibility where the seller's use of contract under31 Cf HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS
32

mines the autonomy of third parties. See Avihay Dorfman, Against Market Insularity: Market,
Responsibility, and Law (in this issue).
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that does not rely on prior social bonds is important even outside the
consumer context because, as noted, it opens opportunities for self-determination that might otherwise be unavailable.
Moreover, markets are not only about exit and mobility; they are
just as much about entry and commitments. The moral significance of
contract-the queen of the market-is exactly that "it allows persons to
create obligation where there was none before," thereby giving free individuals "a facility for extending their reach by enlisting the reliable collaboration of other free persons. ' 34 Contract is conducive to selfdetermination because it enables people to recruit others to advance their
own goals, purposes, and projects-both material and social. Contract
expands the range of meaningful choices people can make to shape their
own lives. It enhances our ability to be the authors of our own lives by
expanding our repertoire of secure interpersonal engagements beyond the
realm of gift-based interactions.
The market extends these autonomy-enhancing functions by further
broadening the scope of choices between differing projects and ways of
life. Markets create a structure that respects and facilitates divergent
ends. Individuals can unbundle their resources according to their own
priorities and "gain from the skill and knowledge of others [they] need
not even know and whose aims could be wholly different from [their]
own. '35 Because "[i]n a market system there is no preordained pattern of
value to which individuals must conform," markets multiply the alternatives people can choose from and facilitate experimentation; they "allow
people to make their own judgments about what they want to buy or sell,
how hard they want to work, how much they want to save, what they
value and how they value it, and what they wish to consume. ' 36 At its
best, the market functions as an enabling device which serves self-authorship: it enables the individual to act upon his own goals and values,
his objective and his plan of life, without subordination to any other individual or subjection to any collective decision-making procedure. 37
D. Autonomy Beyond the Market
Nothing in these claims regarding the role of the market in enabling
mobility and expanding options suggests that markets are sufficient to
facilitate, enable, or even secure people's self-determination, as many
34 Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, inPHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONTRACT 17, 20 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014).
35 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: TmE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
109 (1982).
36 SATZ, supra note 8, at 8. For the market to entail this liberating function, law should
also facilitate the possibility of at least partially exiting the money-based valuation of the
market itself. See infra note 64.
37 JOHN GRAY, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET INSTITUTIONS 25 (1992).
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friends and foes of the market seem to assume. 38 Quite the contrary:
understanding the market as a means for self-determination implies that
markets cannot function well as a standalone autonomy-enhancing device. If markets are to serve people's self-authorship, the expanded
choice afforded by the market must rely on and be guided (at times even
delimited) by its autonomy-enhancing telos. This means that a liberal
regime which endorses markets in the service of self-determination must
be committed to secure the minimal social and economic conditions (or
39
capabilities) needed to enable individuals to make autonomous choices.
I will say no more regarding the implications of this important proposition for health, education, housing, and welfare policy, which go beyond
the realm of the market.40 Rather, the discussion in the second part of
this Article will assume such a background regime and will turn our focus inward: to explore the proper architecture of the market, that is: to
study how it can-indeed should-be shaped so as to optimally serve
self-determination.
Acknowledging the insufficiency of markets for the task of securing
our self-authorship, however, may suggest that the division of labor between the market and this background regime can go even further, so that
the law of the market can avoid taking any responsibility for self-determination. This challenge to the mission of this Article is ultimately misguided. Still, addressing it is helpful given both the significance of its
excesses and the importance of the leeway it leaves the liberal conception of the law of the market.
Radical division of labor, which leaves self-determination solely
with the background regime and not with the market, is misguided for
two reasons. The privileged position of the individual right to self-determination in liberal thought implies that at some point the impact of any
major legal institution-including the market-on individuals must affect its legitimacy irrespective of its contributions to the public good.
Setting up the threshold of this constraint is a complex matter, especially
38 See, e.g., O'NELL, supra note 5, at 68, 70. Furthermore, as the previous text clarifies,
the market is also not strictly necessary for securing autonomy. My argument is more modest:
that markets can be devised in a way in which they can significantly contribute to autonomy.
39 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MoRALrry OF FREEDOM 207 (1986) ("The provision of many
collective goods is constitutive of the very possibility of autonomy and it cannot be relegated
to a subordinate role, compared to some alleged right against coercion, in the name of autonomy."). Cf GRAY, supra note 37, at 37-38, 57-58, 72. For a powerful account of the devastating failures of the attempt to adhere to the liberal conviction to respect choices about
obligations while abdicating the responsibilities of the liberal state by privatizing dependency,
see Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
40 The state, to be sure, can choose to employ market mechanisms for some of these
tasks. See Tsilly Dagan, Hila Shamir & Ayelet Carmeli, Questioning Market Aversion in Gender Equality Strategies:DesigningLegal Mechanismsfor the Promotionof Gender Equality in
the Family and the Market (in this issue).
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in contexts where the public good at hand (say: education) is itself a
prerequisite to autonomy. But even though we may lack an account of
when autonomy should literally function as a side-constraint, recognizing its status as our ultimate right throughout the legal terrain is valuable.
It guides us to take seriously the distinction between self-determination
and other goals that the market serves and to engage in qualitativejudgment where self-determination conflicts with these goals, which are (by
definition) either constitutive of it or instrumental to it.41
The idea of strict division of labor between the market and its background regime is problematic for yet another reason. The law of the market is-at least in modem complex societies-a significant subset of the
private law. This means that a strict division of labor, which renders the
most fundamental liberal commitments irrelevant to the law of the market, eliminates them from a large portion of our interpersonal relationships. As Avihay Dorfman and I argue elsewhere, the significance of
human interdependence to our human condition implies that such a legal
architecture is profoundly unsatisfying. While the justice of the law of
the market is certainly partially dependent on background justice, its dependence cannot relieve it from complying with the distinctive chore of
private law: the construction of ideal frameworks for respectful interac42
tion of self-determining individuals.
Implicit in these observations is both the conclusion that the radical
division of labor which makes self-authorship marginal to the law of the
market is unacceptable, and the acknowledgement that some division of
labor may well be necessary for the market's legitimacy. This last point
is particularly important given the inherent imperfections of market
mechanisms, which go beyond the externalities certain market interactions generate.
Consider, for example, changes in supply or demand triggered by
technological transformations, which may leave very few options to
workers who developed skills that become unnecessary. More generally,
consider the dependence of the market's currency of willingness to pay
not only on people's preferences, but also on their ability to pay, as well
as the role that both luck and misfortune play in the operations of the
market. These features of the market imply that markets often generate
consequences which diverge from their autonomy-enhancing telos. This
divergence can be quite significant and thus might threaten to reintroduce
new forms of hierarchical relations, which are the antithesis of the autonomy-enhancing ideal of the market. Therefore, these imperfections must
41 See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 10, at 43-45, 84-85.

42 See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships,116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395,
1460 (2016). See also Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the
Rawlsian Framework, 36 L. & Pum. 171 (2018).
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be understood and treated as distortions. Insofar as they cannot be properly addressed within the law of the market, these imperfections need to
be remedied by its background regime, which thus becomes essential to
the market's legitimacy, or at least its normative desirability.
II.

AUTONOMY-ENHANCING MARKETS

As noted, the doctrines which prescribe the specific contents, scope,
and implications of the powers conferred by the various property and
contract types law promulgates shape-and not merely reflect-the interpersonal practices of the market. 43 This means that the relevant question to an autonomy-based law of the market does not touch on the
legitimate constraintsto people's autonomy (as it does for many aspects
of tort law), but on the ways that law should enhance people's self-authorship. That is necessarily an ex-ante discussion, about how law can
facilitate forms of holdings and interpersonal interactions concerning
holdings that are conducive to its autonomy-enhancing telos. This inquiry-the mission of what follows-is qualitative rather than quantitative. 44 It is not focused on maximizing the extent of autonomy in the
world but is still teleological, seeking the system that generates the most
45
autonomy-friendly consequences.
A.

Inclusion

The first-and (maybe surprisingly) straightforward-consequence
of understanding markets as means for self-determination is that they
need to be inclusive. Recall my claim that the legitimacy of the law of
the market depends on the crucial role it plays in serving people's right
to self-authorship. 46 Conceptualizing the right of self-authorship as the
ultimate value of the market means that the law's support for certain
interpersonal interactions needs to be justified by reference to their role
in providing people with choices. Given that autonomy as self-authorship
is a general, right-based justification, 47 this proposition implies that
43 See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
44 Working out the criteria of such judgment is an important task, which I cannot venture
to undertake here. But it seems safe to claim that an inquiry of relative contribution to selfdetermination can employ, at least as one of its helpful heuristics, the distinction between our
"ground projects"-that is: the choices that reflect the commitments that make us who we are
- and "sheer preferences" that bear little, if at all, on our conception of our self. See Dagan &
Dorfman, supra note 42, at 1419.
45 Recall, however, that in addition to self-authorship, markets can-and often doserve other goals, notably those mentioned at the outset. Regarding these goals, as well as with
respect to some (but not all) of the implications of self-authorship, an autonomy-based theory
of the market again leaves liberal polities broad leeway for democratic deliberation.
46 See supra text accompanying note 25.
47 General, right-based justifications are distinct from two other types of justifications.
As right-based justifications, they rely on an individual as opposed to a collective interest; as
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every human being is entitled to such choices and that a sufficiently diverse set of options must be available to all. 48 Even in its most restrictive
interpretation, this injunction proscribes discriminatory limits on partici49
pation in market practices.
Antidiscrimination rules are surely not alien to contemporary doctrines governing the market. But they are typically justified quite differently. Antidiscrimination rules in important contexts like the
employment and the housing markets are often presented as entailed by
the commitments to equal opportunity and to social integration or as a
means for improving the efficient functioning of markets. The first two
rationales, equal opportunity and integration, perceive non-discrimination as an external imposition on the operation of the market; a price it
should pay in the name of exogenous, worthy public causes. Furthermore, all three familiar rationales render any antidiscrimination market
rule contingent in the sense that it depends upon the availability of other
state-driven means for securing equal opportunity and social integration
or for improving the operation of the market. This means that where
these public goals are, or can be, otherwise secured, the antidiscrimination rule may not be needed (and thus, on some views, might even become illegitimate). 50
In an autonomy-based understanding of the market, by contrast, antidiscrimination rules are not external constraints of the market, which
limit its putative commitment to independence. To the contrary: antidiscrimination rules that ensure inclusion are necessary measures of perfecting the market's service of its most fundamental telos; its own raison
d'&tre. If the law of the market is to empower its subjects' self-determination-in order for it to be justified by reference to people's right to
self-authorship-it must be inclusive. This means that legal reforms that
extend autonomy along these lines-reforms that open up markets by
alleviating discriminatory barriers-do not require contingent justifications. Rather, they are best understood as devices entailed by the idea of
the market, as means for pushing the law of the market to live up to the
market's implicit ideals (the very ideals Adam Smith celebrated!). An
autonomy-based law of the market must ensure that its rules serve the
general justifications, they rely on the importance of an individual interest as such rather than
on a specific event, as do special right-based justifications.
48 Cf JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 115-17, 423, 425-27,

430-39, 444-45 (1988).
49 More expansive interpretations would imply affirmative duties of inclusion so that, for
example, big developers must offer at least some units to the less well-off and big employers
must offer professional training to those who were not lucky enough to benefit from proper
education. For a preliminary discussion of limits on exclusion generated by poverty, see Dagan
& Dorfman, supra note 42, at 1420-21.
50 See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 42, at 1399, 1439-40; Hanoch Dagan, Between
Regulatory and Autonomy-Based Private Law, 22 EuROPEAN L.J. 644, 657 (2016).
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self-determination of all its subjects; it thus cannot authorize the standing
of private parties to decide whether or not they can discriminate against
51
their fellow humans.
B.

Regret

Many market advocates perceive regret as a pathology and thus find
limits on alienability prima facie troubling. To be sure, the familiar reasons for suspecting the efficiency of market transactions-notably imperfect information, strategic barriers, cognitive failures, or
externalities-are widely acknowledged as justifications for restricting
alienability.52 But as such, these rationales are tentative and contingent,
subject to the (at least theoretically) possible technologies or legal techniques that would ameliorate impeding rationality deficiencies or overcome other pertinent market failures.
A genuinely autonomy-based law of the market requires a different
understanding of regret. Inalienability rules are premised, under this
view, not only on a response to these contingent (and surely important)
reasons. Rather, they are based also, and perhaps even primarily, on the
commitment to self-determination: the conception of individual liberty
53
that puts a high value on people's ability to reinvent themselves.
In other words, if the ultimate value to which the law of the market
must be committed is enhancing people's ability to be the authors of their
lives, then facilitating people's ability legitimately to enlist one another
in pursuing private goals and purposes must not overwhelm their rights
of exit from these relationships. The right to exit is, as noted, one of the
foundations of the autonomy-based case for the market, because self54
authorship requires the ability to both write and rewrite our life-story.
This means that contract law must both enable us to make credible commitments and safeguard our ability to start afresh by limiting the range,
and at times the types, of enforceable commitments we can undertake.
As Aditi Bagchi notes, "[t]he same ideal of moral agency that makes
promise valuable makes the power to revise and reject commitments valuable as well . . .[so that] our interest in moral agency demands both
fidelity and rebellion against [our] former self." 55
51 See Dagan, supra note 50, at 657; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Against Private
Law Escapism: Comment on Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs, 14 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL
STUD. 37, 51 (2017). Cf GRAY, supra note 37, at 29.
52 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of Property Rights, 85
CoLUm. L. REV. 931, 937-41 (1985).
53 Cf RAz, supra note 39, at 384.
54 See supra text accompanying note 26.
55 Aditi Bagchi, Contract and the Problem of Fickle People (unpublished manuscript).
Bagchi argues that this ideal competes with the promissory principle, which she conceives as
uncompromising, and that contract's accommodation of regret is the epitome of the justified
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This seemingly simple statement encapsulates one of the most difficult challenges to an autonomy-enhancing contract law: identifying categories of excessive limitations on contractual parties' exit-that is, on
promisors' freedom to change their mind-that undermine party autonomy to such a degree that they should not be enforceable. 56 I do not have
or know of a formula for resolving this difficulty in a systemic fashion.
But acknowledging the value of regret as one which derives from, rather
than competes with, the normative underpinnings of contract at least provides a strong, principled justification for a number of doctrines which
otherwise may seem rather puzzling.
Thus, the value of regret justifies some restrictions on enforceability
of employee non-compete agreements 57 and some limits on the advance
sale of future wages. 58 It similarly helps explain the unilateral right of
termination of long-term contracts, which is semi-inalienable at least regarding certain contract types. 59 Finally, the value of regret may also
help justify rules that ensure that contractual commitments are not
overly-dogmatic, 60 such as the blanket refusal to specifically enforce
contracts to render personal service, the duty to mitigate, and the fresh
61
start doctrine in bankruptcy.
C.

Intra-Sphere Multiplicity

A state committed to utilizing market mechanisms in order to enhance autonomy has an affirmative obligation to shape the law of the
market. It must be proactive in ensuring availability of a sufficiently diverse range of property and contract types within each important sphere
in which the market can perform its autonomy-enhancing function. This
divergence of contract and promise. Id. As I argue elsewhere, the purported dogmatism of the
promissory principle relies on the misguided transfer theory of promise. Once it is set aside,
we see that there need not be any divergence of contract and promise: both can-indeed
should-accommodate regret and thus must not be overly dogmatic. See DAGAN & HELLER,
supra note 10, at 30-32.
56 Cf. Dori Kimel, Promise, Contract,PersonalAutonomy, and the Freedom to Change
One's Mind, in PmLosoPmcAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 96, 101-03 (Gregory Klass et al.
eds., 2014).
57 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,
594-619 (1999); see also ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 66.
58 See, e.g., Douglas Belkin, More College Students Selling Stock-in Themselves, WALL
ST. J, Aug. 5, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-college-students-selling-stockin-themselves- 1438791977.
59 See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The FiduciaryCharacterof Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions, in PILMOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDucIARY LAW 321, 333-36 (An-

drew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014).
60 It may also further substantiate Robert Scott and Jody Kraus's understanding of some
decisions to breach in benign terms of "a cry for help." See ROBERT E. ScoTr & JODY S.
KRAus, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 113-15 (5th ed. 2013).
61 See Bagchi, supra note 55.
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obligation of intra-sphere multiplicity, as Michael Heller and I call it,62
has the most traction in the less commercial spheres of the market, especially in the labor and the housing markets. Private entrepreneurs predictably under-supply property and contract types in these markets; and
existing law seems to fail to properly address this shortfall.
To be sure, sometimes cognitive, behavioral, structural, and political
economy reasons imply that more choice may actually be autonomy-reducing, and in these cases intra-sphere multiplicity should be curtailed.
But outside the limited circumstances in which these reasons apply, an
autonomy-based justification of the market implies that freedom of contract may be threatened not only by having too much law, but by having
too little as well. An autonomy-enhancing law of the market should accordingly support establishment of emerging types even when demand
63
for the new types is low.

It is difficult to expect that legal systems would routinely invent
new property and contract types. Indeed, carrying out the state's obligation to enhance choice in such a top-down fashion is not necessarily desirable given the comparative disadvantage of state institutions vis-a-vis
contractual parties in coming up with appropriate innovations. For this
reason, at least in typical cases, the carriers of the law of the market need
not (maybe even should not) engage in innovative design. They should,
however, proactively look out for innovations-such as those based on
minority views and utopian theories-that have some traction but would
fail if left to people's own devices due to predictable market failures. The
state should be favorably predisposed to such innovations insofar as
these outliers have the potential to add valuable options for human flourishing that significantly broaden people's choices. 64
Take the labor market as an example. The prevailing structure of
employment contracts offers a binary choice between employee and independent contractor status. But emerging forms on the ground-such as
62 See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 10, on which this section relies.
63 Pursuing this agenda requires reliance on systemic behavioral and institutional economics studies that could be informative as to the optimal number of contract and property
types and the optimal degree of variance among them. Similar studies are also required in
order to properly consider other factors-such as market structure and political economy-that
may necessitate, as noted in the text, actively limiting multiplicity or at least guarding against
its potential pitfalls.
64 As the text implies, part of the task of facilitating intra-sphere multiplicity involves the
provision of options for "partial exit" from the market itself: frameworks that support business
models which are based less on competition and profit maximization and more on sharing and
collaboration. See RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN AMERICAN CrrIES:
REFORMING URBAN MARKET REGULATIONS (forthcoming 2018) (Dyal-Chand contrasts these
formations with "liberal market economy"; as the text clarifies, I claim that their facilitation is
in fact required by liberalism, properly interpreted). Cf Gar Alperovitz, The Pluralist Commonwealth and Property-Owning Democracy, in PROPERTY-OWNING DEMOCRACY: RAWLS

AND BEYOND 266 (Martin O'Neil & Thad Williamson eds., 2012).
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workers who provide their own equipment and control their own hours
but are still subject to others' authority (such as Uber) or workers seeking
the creation of specifically designated worker co-ops-may call for additional categories and thus additional choice. There are also other possibilities that diverge even further from the existing employment
landscape. For example, law can be instrumental in facilitating job-sharing arrangements that stabilize norms of responsibility, attribution, decision-making mechanisms, time division, shared space and equipment,
and availability on off days. By the same token, an autonomy-based approach to employment contracts would suggest that instead of choosing
between the 'at will' and the 'for cause' regimes as defaults, states would
be advised to promulgate two parallel employment types, so that employers would need to opt in to one or the other.
Pursuing this prescription of securing such intra-sphere multiplicity
can also be invaluable in the housing market. Consider, for example, the
benefits of providing 'off-the-rack' contractual arrangements for the
emerging insurance and financial products that allow homeowners to
share or offload the risk that the value of their home will decrease due to
changes in the state of the neighborhood or in the overall housing market. 65 Helping middle-income households separate house-as-home from
house-as-investment along these lines is not just a good policy response
to public macro-concerns; it is also an important tool for complying with
the prescription of intra-sphere multiplicity.
Unfortunately, for lower-income households who cannot afford to
buy in the first instance, this tool does not offer a viable alternative to
renting. For people of modest means the commitment to choice requires
the law of the market to facilitate models of shared equity homeownership. These models-notably community land trusts, limited equity cooperatives, and deed-restricted homes-link "low- and moderate-income
people with affordable owner-occupied housing" by combining three features: "(1) they lower the initial cost of purchasing a home; (2) they limit
the gain a homebuyer can receive on resale, thus generating a relatively
affordable price for a subsequent buyer; and (3) they frequently provide
stewardship to maintain community values and help homeowners retain
and maintain their homes. ' 6 6

65 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1047
(2008).
66 Brett Theodos et al., Urban Institute, Affordable Homeownership: An Evaluation of
SharedEquity Programs 3-4, 56 (2017), www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88876/
affordablehomeownershipO./pdf. See also, e.g., Michael Diamond, The Meaning and Nature
of Property: Homeownership and Shared Equity in the Context of Poverty, 29 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 85, 88-89, 102-03 (2009).
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For these models of tenure to thrive, they should overcome the occasional monitoring problem 67 and typically need to rely on some public
(or public-spirited) sponsorship. 68 Friends of the market who understand
that oftentimes the autonomy-enhancing telos of the market requires a
supportive background regime that ensures the minimal conditions of
choice 69 should not be deterred by these challenges. 70 Rather, they
should embrace such initiatives that "may produce near-term financial
benefits for those who would otherwise be unable to buy a home," and
"help individuals purchase homes in neighborhoods with higher home
values and education levels than they would have been able to
'7 1
otherwise.
D. Relational Equality
If markets are to serve people's self-determination, and not only
their independence, the law of the market cannot rely, as it is conventionally portrayed, on a formal conception of equality that seeks to abstract
away the particular features distinguishing one person from another. To
sharpen the point, respecting each other's independence does not require
any consideration of any individual's features-it merely prescribes a
negative duty of noninterference. By contrast, respect for self-determination is hollow without some attention to our distinctive features, which
72
make us who we actually are.
Indeed, reciprocal respect for party autonomy requires that we view
parties as more than mere bearers of a generic human capacity for
choice. In addition, for the interacting parties meaningfully to treat each
other as free and equal persons, law must ensure, at least to an extent,
their equal standing regarding their interaction. Such a view of relational
equality is substantive and not just formal. Admittedly, in a significant
subset of the law of the market-dealing notably with business contracts,
that is, contracts between firms-formal equality is the all-things-considered best proxy for a state of affairs in which the participants are, more
67 See John E. Davis, More than Money: What is Shared in Shared Equity Homeownership?, J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CoMMUNrry DEV. L., Spring/Summer 2010, at 259, 268.
68 See John E. Davis, Shared Equity Homeownership, in NATIONAL HOUSING INSTrrUTE

75 (2006), http://www.nhi.org/pdf/SharedEquityHome.pdf; Diamond, supra note 66, at 87-89;
Edwin Stromberg & Brian Stromberg, The Federal Housing Administration and Long-Term
Affordable Homeownership Programs, 15(2) CITYSCAPE 247, 248-50 (2013).
69 Cf Ryan Sherriff, Shared Equity Homeownership State Policy Review, J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNrrY DEV. L., Spring/Summer 2010, at 279 (discussing state and local
laws that hinder or support shared equity homeownership programs).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
71 REPORT ON AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 66, at 45; cf Susan Saegert et
al., Longing for a Better American Dream: Homeowners in Trouble Evaluate Shared Equity
Alternatives, 96 (2) Soc. SC. Q. 297 (2015).
72 See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 42, at 1413-20.
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or less, in a relationship of substantive equality. But elsewhere the relationships aren't substantively equal, which means that an autonomy-en73
hancing law can no longer legitimately use this proxy.
An important example for this comes from the law governing the
employment market; indeed, commitment to relational equality is the essence of labor law: the law dealing with collective forms of employment.7 4 As the introductory section to the Wagner Act makes explicit,
the purpose of allowing labor unions to flourish is to address "[tihe inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who
are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association."' 75 Labor law attempts to solve this inequality by giving employees
the chance to bargain collectively and thus to place themselves on more
equal footing with their employers-with the goal that their resulting
contracts embody the voluntariness that is fundamental to real market
76
choice.
One may worry that the mere possibility of workers' unionization
cannot be enough to meet relational equality concerns in employment
markets, and that to distinguish contract from subjugation, individualized
contracting should be effectively abolished. 77 But this concern is exaggerated. While current labor law may not be fully successful in equalizing bargaining power between employers and employees, the ability of
individual employees-either unionized or not-to bargain in the
shadow of labor law makes a real difference. 78 So long as unionization
remains a realistic possibility, non-union employee contracts may fall
79
beneath the protective shadow of labor law.
73 Id., at 1424-25.
74 See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2016).
75 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 151 (1935).
76 See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1423 (1993).
77 Cf Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 561, 629-30 (1983).
78 See Paul Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directionfor the Law of the Workplace, 102
YALE L.J. 1907, 1911 (1993).
79 See id. at 1912-13. For labor law to function this way-supporting relational equality
of both union and non-union employees-unions should be able to negotiate so-called "agency
shop" contracts that require employees to pay union dues as a condition of employment. To the
extent "right to work" laws in some states now prohibit agency shop, these laws limit the
contractual freedom of both union and non-union employees. Moreover, and more importantly,
agency shop does not meaningfully reduce individual autonomy. It results in an ex ante reduction in the amount of money belonging to an employee who has to pay dues, in return for
higher wages and benefits and better working conditions. Even assuming that there are employees who are unwilling third-party beneficiaries to agency shop provisions, a sufficient
multiplicity of contract types ought to empower employees to seek out employers with desirable union agreements. Mandatory rules are particularly justified where they are needed in order
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To be sure, even though labor law is a significant means for reinstating relational equality in the labor market, it cannot be enough. The
hierarchical organization that typifies the workplace explains employment law's insistence on an inalienable infrastructure of just relationships, dealing with topics like workplace safety and nondiscrimination. 80
It may well justify further reinforcement of workers' autonomy by entrenching a workplace bill of rights that would protect them against managers' arbitrary and unaccountable authority, particularly insofar as they
purport to regulate workers' off-hour lives. 8 1
Indeed, these and other doctrines and contract types courts use narrow the permitted gap between the (required) commitment to substantive
equality and the (pragmatic) use of formal equality as an imperfect
proxy.82 They help effectuate a proper ideal of the market as underwriting horizontal relationships based on free interaction, substantive equality, and thus (most fundamentally) reciprocal respect for selfdetermination. 83 In other words, markets that diverge too much from the
prescription of relational equality are not only "noxious markets [that]
undermine the conditions that people need if they are to relate as
equals."' 84 Rather, they are also fundamentally markets which structure
interpersonal relationships in a way that undermines the very ideal of
interaction as equals on which the telos-and indeed the legitimacy-of
the market is based.
E. Incomplete Commodification
Founding the value of markets on self-determination implies that
market transactions must be voluntary undertakings and that the market
should open up a sufficiently robust set of contractual options. It also
implies that the utility surplus-the material benefits which such transactions generate-must be understood as an instrumental value, a means to
the superior end of promoting the parties' autonomy. 85 Facilitating parties' preference satisfaction is important, in this view of the market, because and to the extent that it is conducive to people's selfto sustain the viability of intra-sphere multiplicity. See

DAGAN

& HELLER, supra note 10, at

87-88.
80 See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Bureaucrats of Private Law, http://papers.ssm
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3031886; Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 42, at 1442-45.
81 See ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 39-40, 48-54, 60, 62-64, 67-69. Cf. Jeff SpinnerHalev, The Limits of Liberal Opportunity Arguments (unpublished manuscript).
82 See generally Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 42, at 1425; Avihay Dorfman, Private
Law Exceptionalism? Part II: A Basic Difficulty with the Argument from Formal Equality
CAN. J.L. & JURISP. (forthcoming 2018); Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 195 (1987). Cf PuRDY,supra note 27, at 112.
83 Cf SATZ, supra note 8, at 42-43, 95, 99.
84 Id. at 94, 97.
85 Cf T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 118-23 (1998).
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determination.8 6 Thus, utilitarian considerations-even those that pertain
only to the contracting parties-must generally be subservient to the
market's ultimate value of autonomy. 87 This means that preferences that
undermine self-determination should be generally overridden. The law of
the market cannot legitimately facilitate types of transactions in which
88
the parties' welfare-enhancement threaten their self-determination.
My discussion of regret already captures a subset of these cases, but
it does not exhaust this category. There are certain types of contracteven beyond the obvious example of slavery-which instrumentalize
people to such an extent that might efface their humanity by erasing their
ability to self-determine. 89 This risk of allowing the means (utility) to
overwhelm the end (self-determination) is particularly acute in the context of employment. Although Marx's account of the proletariat's predicament in labor markets may not be an accurate description of many postindustrialized labor markets, there are still-unfortunately not negligible-employment settings in which workers are dehumanized and
treated as "fungible gears in a huge machine." 90 Sweatshops are extreme
cases, 91 but there are probably many others in which workers are treated
as disposable commodities. While there may be hard cases in which such
employment conditions may be legitimate, 92 in most contexts an autonomy-enhancing market cannot sanction transactions that involve such il93
legitimate commodification.
Addressing this crucial aspect of the labor market is obviously an
enormous task that-like the other features of an autonomy-enhancing
market discussed earlier-cannot be fully undertaken in this short Arti86 Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974) (outlining a
thought experiment of an experience machine).
87 Party sovereignty, in other words, is significant not only due to epistemological reasons-in which parties are perceived as carriers of the best information regarding their preferences-but also, indeed primarily, due to its intrinsic value. See Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets?
Welfare, Autonomy, and The Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019).
88 See DAGAN & HELLER, at 90-91.

89 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS
9 (2012). As the text implies, the pertinent risk I discuss need not, although it often does,
involve also violations of the parties' relational equality. For a famous example of such a case,
see Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 209-12 (1980) (discussing
the case of the enlightened slave owner).
90 Cf. OMAN, supra note 3, at 171.
91 See generally LYN K.L. TJON SOEILEN, MINIrUM CONTRACT JUSTICE: A CAPABILITIES PERSPECTIVE ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS 60-64 (2017).

92 The cautionary language of the text refers paradigmatically to cases in which one
generation voluntarily undertakes certain derogatory obligations in order to secure the prerequisites of autonomy to its successor.
93 Notice that this anti-commodification rationale is immune from the critique of other
"corruption" arguments that may violate the injunction of equal concern and respect. See Lyn
K.L. Tjon Soei Len, Equal Respect, Capabilitiesand the Moral Limits of Market Exchange,
2017 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 1, 115-16.
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cle. But three preliminary observations may nonetheless be made. The
first is by now familiar: although the perspective advanced in these pages
surely does not exhaust the moral qualms we should have with certain
contemporary labor markets, the critique it may generate seems uniquely
powerful. Certain labor markets undermine the very autonomy-enhancing ideal of the market itself and are thus condemnable qua markets. This
is the case in markets that involve unskilled, fungible work, whichwhen combined with the workplace hierarchical structure-might become so alienating given the number of hours one spends at work each
day that they can no longer be reasonably understood as a means to, let
alone components of, workers' self-determination. 94 Therefore, proponents of the market who celebrate its contribution to people's self-authorship cannot but object to these practices and work to eradicate or
transform them.
My second observation is that the context of labor markets seems
particularly inviting to what Margaret Jane Radin calls the "incomplete
commodification" strategy, in which money exchanges hands but the interactions retain a personal aspect. As Radin notes, complete decommodification of work is not now possible (and may not be desirable). But
the labor market can be regulated in a way that prevents workers from
deteriorating into the status of completely monetizable and tangible objects of exchange. By so doing, the labor market can take into account
their personal contribution and recognize, even foster, the noncommodified significance of their work and of their relations with other people in
95
the workplace.
The important point here, and my third (and final) observation, is
that such regulation should ameliorate workers' voiceless position. This
observation relies on the claim that the idea of the market does not necessarily imply impersonality and thus need not always preclude voice.9 6 As
noted, in many market contexts the hegemony of exit over voice and the
impersonal nature of the interaction need not be troubling to their function in service of self-determination. But in the specific subset of the
labor markets addressed now, epitomized by "grinding assembly-line
jobs that hardly anyone could treat as humane work,"' 97 this feature be94 Cf.Nien-he Hsieh, Work, Ownership,and Productive Enfranchisement, in PROPERTYOWNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 64, at 149, 153.
95 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 103-10 (1996). Radin treats
the adjectives "noncommodified" and "non-market" as interchangeable. As is clear by now, I
disagree. But this disagreement has no bearing on the current claim.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. See generally Roy Kreitner, Voicing the
Market: Extending the Ambition of Contract Theory (unpublished manuscript) ("[M]arkets
potentially provide extensive room for discussion of the reasons to value a product, a service,
or an investment. Contracting in markets can be a site of reasoned discussion about what the
market should achieve, rather than exclusively a single-minded means to maximize returns.").
97 RADIN, supra note 95, at 106.
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comes particularly troubling because with it these types of workers no
longer have any control over a significant subset of their day. 9 8 Therefore, rehabilitating these labor markets-bringing them back to the universe of at least potentially autonomy-enhancing markets-requires
ameliorating the voiceless position of these workers, 99 either by facilitating their union representation or by assuring through other means that
they have some say in workplace decisions so their nonfungible status
within the enterprise can be recognized. 100
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Markets are complex phenomena with heterogeneous manifestations. They involve different types of goods and services and can be
structured around different property and contract types. This plurality of
markets justifies a careful attitude towards the definition of a market. It
also counsels some suspicion towards overly-broad normative judgments, be they celebratory or critical, launched at markets-as-such.
But markets are powerful institutions that significantly impact individuals, affect relationships, and shape societies. They should thus be
subject to critical scrutiny vis-A-vis the various goals that justify the complex legal arrangements which sustain them. Promoting social welfare,
rewarding desert, inculcating virtues, and spreading power are all worthy
objectives that deserve their prominent status in this crucial exercise. But
at least for a liberal polity, facilitating our self-authorship must be the
fundamental goal.
Markets play a vital autonomy-enhancing role of enabling mobility
and expanding options. Appreciating the significance of these functions
and their emancipatory potential implies that liberal polities should strive
to shape markets in line with this telos of the market. I do not pretend to
have offered an exhaustive treatment of this challenge in this short Article; 10 1 but I do hope that I have made some progress and, even more
significantly, demonstrated the promise of this endeavor.

98 See ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 128-30.
99 Cf. Anderson, supra note 9, at 146.
100 See RAD N, supra note 95, at 110; ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 69-70.
101 Shifting from local to global markets adds a further layer of complexity. See Hanoch
Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Interpersonal Human Rights, 51 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming
2018).

